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THE RESPONSE OF WAGES AND
ACTUAL HOURS WORKED TO THE
REDUCTIONS OF STANDARD HOURS
ABSTRACT
A transformation of what had become a universal 40 hour standard work week in Germany
began in 1985 with reductions negotiated in the metal-working and printing sectors. These
reductions have continued through 1995, and were followed by reductions in other sectors. The
union campaign aimed to increase employment through “work-sharing,” and is being emulated in
the United States with the launch of a reduced hours campaign by the AFL-CIO. Using data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel, I find that increased overtime or reduced short time was little
used to offset the reduction in standard hours: a one hour reduction in standard hours appears to have
translated into a reduction in actual hours worked of between 0.85 and 1 hour for workers in
manufacturing. One might expect this to have resulted in a loss of earnings for workers in affected
industries. However, I substantiate the union claim of “full wage compensation”: reductions in
standard hours were accompanied by arelative rise in the hourly straight-time wage of 2-3% for each
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hunt @econ.yale.eduFrom 1 April 1985 week~ working time was reduced to 38.5 hurs w“thfill wage
compensation. ~..] In 1987 the metalworking and printing industries were paw to new
agreemems which reduced working time in two stages to 37 hours a week, wi”thfill wage
compens~-on. [...]
In the event, ttid to the economic upw”ng thut started in 1984, it was the wage
restraints inco~orated in the agreements that proved to be the more important
concession.
Gerhard Bosch, German Confederation of Trade Unions (1990)
Many pple believe that a reduction in hours worked per person would lead (or has led)
to increased employment. Whether “work-sharing” is effective at a given wage is, however,
thwretically ambiguous, and in addition to the scale eff=t, depends upon substitution eff~ts
betw=n workers and other factors of production. In the United States the AFL-CIO has
launched a campaign for a four-day 32-hour week, while reducd standard hours are also the
preferred route to shorter actual hours in Europe. Yet with overtime a possibility, a reduction
in the standard work week may lead to a less than one for one reduction in actual hours per
week. Hence, the link between standard and actual hours is a key one for work-sharing.
Furthermore, the response of wages to reductions in actual hours is critical. If the reduction in
hours brings workers closer to their optimal hours, theory suggests they maybe prepared to take
a cut in hourly wages. In the European setting, however, unions have typically demanded an
increase in hourly wages to
in employment less likely.
compensate the lost hours, which would appear to make increases
Standard hours were greatly reduced in (West) Germany beginning
rductions were initiated by trade unions, unlike in countries such as France,




standard hours translated approximately one for one into reductions in actual hours, although this
1
!
.,has not been examined using micro-data. There is less consensus on the response of wages,
however. On the one hand, unions claim to have achieved standard hours reduction with “full
wage compensation”, that is, no reduction in monthly pay, which suggests that hourly wages
may have risen in affwted industries relative to those with no standard hours reductions. On
the other hand, observers including union observers suggest that standard hours reductions
caused “wage restraint”. T’hese two possibilities may be reconciled if the hourly wage raises
workers in the affected industries would have received in the absence of standard hours
reductions were higher than the raise nded merely to compensate the lost hours. In this case,
hourly wages could rise, but likely by less than in other industries.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the period 1984-1989, I establish
that for Arbeiter (workers paid hourly) in manufacturing, actual hours fell by 0.85-1 hour in
response to a one hour fall in standard hours. Evidence for services and Angestellten (salaried
employees) is more difficult to analyze. At least for one class of workers there is thus indeed
a large loss in hours to be compensated. I then examine wages, and find that workers in sectors
achieving reductions in standard hours bargtined sufficient increases in the straight-time hourly
wage that their monthly pay did not fall relative to other workers. These results are inconsistent
with the hypothesis that standard hours reductions caused wage restraint.
Hours Reductiom in Germany
Unions in Germany bargain at the industry level, and conditions of union contracts apply
not only to members, but to almost all other workers as well, Annual hours may be rduced
either by increasing holiday time or by reducing standard w~kly hours. By 1975 the prevailingconditions were 40 hours per week and 30 days annual leave, and by 1981 95% of workers had
a standard working week of 40 hours1. The metal workers’ union, IG MeMl, which along with
the printing union IG Druck had spearheaded earlier reductions in w=kly hours, struck
unsuccessfully in 1978-9 to reduce standard w=kly hours below 40. Other unions, such as IG
Chemie, the chemical union, focused on reducing life-time hours by reducing the retirement age.
IG Metall resumd its demands in 1982-3, and was su-sful after a protracted strike in early
1984. The d~lared aim of the hours reductions was a reduction in unemployment through
work-sharing. Hours in the metal-working =tor (employing almost four million workers) were
reduced to 38.5 in 1985.
A key element of the agreement, upon which agr=ments in many other sectors were
modelled, was the concession to employers of greater flexibility in the use of standard hours.
In particular, standard hours no longer had to be spread evenly over each day of the week, and
could in fact vary
certain number of
from week to week as long as they averaged to the agreed number over a
months. Also, standard hours could vary across employees as long as they
averaged to the agreed number. It is important to note that the implementation of flexibility is
a matter to be negotiated at the plant level between the management and the works muncil, and
surveys have found that the majority of plants, particularly small plants, have not taken
advantage of the flexibility provisions (Bosch et. al. 1988).
A further issue to be resolved by management and
implementation of the reduced standard w=k. Some firms
works councils is the method of
reduced hours on Thursdays and
Fridays, some reduced the hours of each w=kday by an equal amount, while others redud
hours by awarding workers days off. Bosch (1990) reports that, initially, capital-intensive
3industries preferred days off, while labor intensive industries reduced weekly or daily hours.
As the standard work week fell further, however, the number of days off to be allocati became
too great to be efficient, and the move to a reduction in daily hours (or a mixture of reduction
in hours and days off) became more generalized.
Finally, certain union agreements recommended caps on overtime (or the compensation
of some overtime with days off) to prevent the substitution of overtime hours for standard hours.
This is again something to be implemented at the plant level by the works muncil and
management, and is obviously
The agreement in the
potentially important for work-sharing.
metal-working =tor and the simultanmus agreement in the
printing s=tor were followd by more and more manufacturing and servim industries over the
subsequent years. IG Metall itself in two later agr=ments negotiated further step-wise
reductions in standard hours, which have recently culminated (October 1995)
week. IG Metil has announced that it seeks further reductions. Average




annual hours per worker were 10% lower in Germany than in the U.S. (Bell and Fr&man
1995).2
The agreements reached concerning standard hours often extend over a period of several
years, involving step-wise falls in hours, while wages typically continue to be renegotiated each
year. An important question is how the wages negotiated were influenced by standard hours
reductions and flexibility concessions. In most cases the unions announcd that hey had
achieved their aim of “full wage compensation”, meaning that w=kly or monthly earnings
(without overtime) were not reduced despite the hours rductions (which implies a rise in the
4hourly straight-time wage). It is not clear how to measure the success of “full wage
compensation”, however. At a minimum it presumably means that nominal monthly earnings
did not fall (and inflation was low in the 1980s). Real wages were rising steadily, however, and
monthly earnings, and hence possibly hourly wages, might have fallen relative to those in ~tors
without falls in standard hours. Lehment (1991) notes that the period of standard hours
reductions in the 1980s was a period of wage restraint (defined as the gap between nominal GDP
growth and nominal wage growth) at the aggregate level, and notes that the standard hours
reductions may have permitted this restraint. Stille and Zwiener (1988) believe basal on earlier
trends that monthly pay in industries reducing hours rose more slowly than would have othenvise
been the case, but do not make a pronouncement regarding hourly wages.
~eory
Consider a firm taking standard hours (~, hourly wages (w) and the rental rate of capital
(r) as given, and choosing actual hours (h), employment ~ and capital (K) in the presen~ of
fixed costs of employment (f), and an overtime premium (p):
(1) =hJJ g(hfln - wW-fl-~h-hJN- rK
Assume that this firm chooses non-zero overtime hours (h> ~. Consider now an exogenous
reduction in standard hours, which due to the overtime premium increases labor costs. There
will be a scale effect, tending to reduce employment and hours per week, and a substitution
eff=t from labor senices to capital. Substitution between hours and workers is made clwer
by considering the marginal cost of hiring an additional
an additional hour’s work by existing workers (MCJ:
worker (MCN)and the marginal cost of
5MCN - Wh+f+pw(h-h) (7.)
MCh - (1+p)wN
\-
Clmly the marginal cost of additional overtime is unaffected by standard hours (and




additional worker is increased when standard hours are redud, since more of this worker’s
wages must be paid at the overtime premium. Hence, the firm will substitute from workers to
hours, an effect which obviously tends to decrease employment. Figure la shows the two
marginal cost schedules for original standard hours Lo and reducd standard hours ~1. This case
is that of a firm originally having optimal hours such as h.’. Employment will therefore fall,
and the effect on weekly hours depends upon whether the scale effect and substitution from labor
to capital dominates the substitution from workers to hours.
Figure la makes clear, however, that the original optimal hours (and the magnitude of
the standard hours reduction) are critical for the response of the firm along the worker-hours
margin. Consider a firm whose optimal hours are below even the new standard hours, at h!.
If we assume that the law constrains hours to be at least standard hours, this firm will move its
actual hours from the original kink point h: to the new kink point h,l. MC~ has thus not
changed, while MCNhas fallen, and the firm will substitute from hours to workers, the opposite
of the previous case. The scale effect and the capital-labor substitution effect will work to
increase employment. The overall effect is that hours will fall, while employment will rise.
We could extend the analysis to cases permitting firms to work less than standard hours
(since this is possible in Germany, albeit not on a permanent basis). If a firm’s original hours
are below both the new and old standard, as in h.bin Figure la, the fall in standard hours willnot aff~t its behavior. If its original hours are above the new standard hours, workers-hours
substitution will depend on all the magnitudes involved (while scale and capital-labor substitution
effects will tend to lower employment and hours).
For the firm with original optimal hours hf, the response to a fall in standard hours is
different if we allow the overtime premium to be a positive function of the number of overtime
hours. Many German industry contracts specify a 25%premium for the first ten overtime hours ,
per week or two overtime hours per day, and a higher premium thereafter. If the fall in
standard hours means the firm’s current hours are now in the higher premium mne, as in Figure
lb, the MC~ may rise more than the MCN, and the firm will substitute from hours to workers.
The net effmt on employment will be ambiguous, and hours will fall.3
These cases make clear that if employment is to rise, there must be a large substitution
from hours to workers. The finding that actual hours fall a lot is a nwessary condition for
work-sharing to be effective, but it is not a sufficient condition, since actual hours may be falling
due to the scale effect or substitution to capital. Substitution from hours to workers is more
likely the closer substitutes hours per week and workers are in production.4 It is also more
likely if many firms’ optimal hours are below standard hours and they cannot use short-time to
avoid being constined to work standard hours. This suggests that the timing of the hours
reduction in the business cycle could be important: standard hours rductions at business cycle
troughs when optimal hours may be low compared to standard hours are more likely to lead to
increased employment (or possibly stable employment if there are hoarded workers) and reduced
actual hours.
7It is important to consider that other parameters might change in response to the reduction
in standard hours. The overt concession in exchange for shorter standard hours on the part of
German unions was the introduction of greater flexibility. Presumably flexibility has a positive
scale effect, but it may be complementary with capital, and its effect on the trade-off between
workers and hours must be examined in a more complex model.
Another consideration important for Germany is that the hourly (straight-time) wage
bargained may have been influenced by the standard hours reductions. Calmfors (1985), Heel
(1987) and Houpis (1993) endogenize the wage in a model of work-sharing with a monopoly
union. If the rduction in hours brings hours closer to the workers’ optimum, the value of the
additional leisure may allow the wage to fall, although the result is ambiguous. (Forces working
to raise the hourly wage include the fact that lower monthly income reduces the disutility of
unemployment.) A wage decrease would cause a substitution from workers to hours due to the
fixed cost of hiring a worker. 5 The net effect on hours is
employment is ambiguous, although we would usually ex~t the
therefore positive, and on
scale effmt and substitution
from capital to predominate and raise employment. We have seen, however,




Finally, it is possible that individuals are more productive when they work fewer hours.
bwer actual hours thus induce capital-saving t~hnological progress. This has an ambiguous
effect on the already ambiguous employment response, but should lead to a larger fall (or lower
rise) in actual hours.This section has considered ordy the effects of a rduction in working hours, not the
causes - for a general analysis of union choice of hours, see Earle and Pencavel (1990). Bell
and Freeman (1995) examine the issue of why Germans want to work less than Americans.
Previom Empirical Work
A number of papers use aggregate manufacturing times series data to look at the effect
of standard hours on actual hours and employment, including Franz and Konig (1986), who
examine Germany from 1964-84, an =lier period of reduction in standard hours. They report
that a 1% reduction in standard hours both reduces a worker’s total hours by 0.99% and
increases a worker’s overtime by 0.4%. Hart and Sharot (1978) and de Regt (1988) find that
a 1% reduction in standard hours rtiuces actual hours by 0.92 % for the UK in the period 1961-
72, and by 0.89 % for the Netherlands in the period 1954-82, respectively (see also Hamermesh
1993). Brunello (1989), examining Japan in the period 1973-86, finds a different result: that
reducing standard hours has essentially no effect on actual hours. These papers, as well as
Wadhwani (1987) and Faini and Schiantarelli (1985), find that a 1% reduction in standard hours
raises employment by 0.2- 1.0%.
Hart (1987) uses pooled data for 25 German industries for 1969-81 and finds that a 1%
reduction in standard hours reduces actual hours (corrected for short time) by 1.2% (significantly
different from one), contrary to theory. The variation in standard hours in this pooled
specification comes from both the cross-section and time-series. The only paper to examine
these issues using micro-data is Hart and Wilson (1988), which uses British firm-level data
pooled for the period 1978-82. The drawback of this paper is that the variation in standard
9hours appears to come in the cross-swtion rather than time-series dimension. They find that a
one hour reduction in standard hours reduces actual hours by 0.77 hours. Neither of these
papers finds a significant effect of standard hours on employment.
Stille and Zwiener (1987) attempt to tease out the effects of the 1985 standard hours
reduction in the metal-working swtor by examining aggregate trends in actual hours, overtime,
short time and employment for that sector. They judge that weeldy overtime per person was
about one hour higher in the years following the standard hours reduction of 1.5 hours, and
guess that perhaps half of the increase in overtime was due to the cyclical upswing, and half due
to reductions in standard hours. They believe that the reduction in short time was unaffected
by reductions in standard hours, and influenced only by the business cycle. Their employment
figures imply an elasticity of employment with res~t to standard hours of about -0.5, which
lies betw~n the elasticities found by the employers’ association and the union.
Thr= papers address numerically the question of wages and hours reductions in
Germany. Macro-simulations in Stille (1995) suggest unit labor costs were lower in the period
1982-92 than they would have been in the absence of standard hours reductions. Franz and
Smolny (1994) address this issue (amongst others) in a macro time-series model using quarterly
data for German manufacturing from 1970-1989. They find that in certain industries hourly
wages rose in response to falls in standard hours. Finally,
wage restraint is controlled for, reductions in standard hours
Lehment (1991) finds that, when
are insignificant in aggregate time
series modelling employment growth for 1973-90. Manufacturing time series for Sweden
(Holmlund and Pencavel 1988) and Norway (Nymoen 1989) suggest that hourly wages rise when
standard hours fall.
10In a paper closely related to mine, Trejo (1991) examines the effat of the mandated
overtime premium in the United States on hours workd and wages. Notice that the effwts of
incrasing the overtime premium may be cancelled out by rducing the straight-time wage, so
that the effmt of the overtime premium may appear exclusively in wages. (The quivalent for
a rduction in standard hours is a reduction in the fwed wst of employmerit.) He finds evidence
that the wage does adjust partially to offset an increase in the overtime premium, but that the
offset is not complete, so that effats appear in other variables such as hours worked.
Data
The data used are from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1984-1989. The
variables of most interest here are the answers to the questions about hours on the cument job
(after the first survey, the questionnaire spuifies that if the respondent has more than one job,
that s/he should refer to the main job). The questions asked every year are: “What are your
collwtively bargained weekly work hours without overtime?”, and “What is on average your
actual work time including any overtime ~ours per w~k]?”.6 Some information about the
worker’s firm is known: the industry (35 categories) and firm size (four categories). Except in
1987, workers were asked about the compensation for overtime: whether they are paid, r~ive
days off, a mixture of the two, or whether they are not compensated (or do not work overtime).
In 1986,1988 and 1989 the hours questions were followed by the question: “In the last
month: did you work overtime, and if so, how much [hours]?”. Notice that in addition to asking
about monthly rather than weekly hours, this question s~ifically asks about the previous
month, rather than about what happens on average.
11The survey does ask about short-time, and bad weather work interruptions for
construction workers, but unfortunately only about the number of wwks of short-time or bad
weather compensation receivd in the previous year. Some respondents rworded actual work
time below standard (agreed) work time, but only a minority of them reported having received
short-time or bad weather compensation in the following year’s survey. The rest may be due
either to measurement error in either the hours variables or in short-time, may refl=t redud
hours due to illness or other cause (despite the fact that the question asks about the average
week), or may indicate uncompensated hours lost due to short-time work.
The fact that some workers receive their standard hours rduction or overtime
compensation in the form of days off would not matter if tiey accurately repofied actual hours
from, for example, the survey w=k. Those workers with their days off in that w=k would
average with those working more than standard hours in that week. Unfortunately, the question
about actual hours refers to an “average” w=k, while the question about “last month” specifies
overtime, rather than actual hours, and will obviously not elicit negative responses. Since
workers may not think of a w=k with days off as an average week and sin= monthly overtime
cannot be negative, it is possible that both reported actual hours and actual hours calculated as
standard hours plus reported overtime are overestimates. If the trend is towards more
compensation with days off for those with falling standard hours, my result will be biased
toward finding a shift to overtime and increased actual hours. If the use of days off follows a
more complicate pattern over time, the effect is unclear. Many firms have introduced flexitime
for Angestellten, who in some cases may choose to work more for a period in order to bank
days off. Similar issues may apply in this case.7
12It would be helpful if one could la from the GSOEP about standard annual hours,
rather than w~kly hours. This would circumvent some of the ambiguity in the response to the
questions about w=kly hours, and is also in a sense more the variable of interest. However,
there is no good measure of annual standard or actual hours.
The wage variable usd is earnings on main job in the previous month, without bonuses
(common bonuses are thirteenth month salary, holiday money etc). The only other wage
information available concerns total monthly earnings in the previous year.
I wish to focus on full-time workers, and hence drop respondents who said they had less
than 35 standard hours. I also drop workers who said their standard hours were greater than
45, to remove the most obvious outliers (standard hours for all included industries were 40 or
less throughout the sample period). I drop workers in fishing, agriculture, or private
households, and the self-employed, for whom standard hours are not well-defined. I drop
workers agd 55 or over, since during the period under consideration special agr~ments were
reached in some industries to reduce the hours of older workers below those of others in the
same industry or to allow early retirement. I also drop those doing apprenticeships and those
under age 20, although they could arguably be included. Finally, I drop those with missing
actual or standard (agrA) hours, industry, firm size, job type (self-employed, salaried etc) or
ducation.
Published standard hours by industry are obtained from tables supplied by the WSI
(Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts des Deutschen Gewerkschaftbundes) (Hans-
Bockler-Stiftung 1995). Data on industry-level sales are obtained from the Statistisches
Bundesamt, and are deflated with the producer price index.
13Hours and Overtime Compensation in the GSOEP Data
A first chak is made by comparing two measures of overtime from the GSOEP data with
published data for non-self-employed full-time workers (IAB 1994). For the purposes of this
comparison the sample differs from that used in the rest of the paper: only the self-employed,
and those with standard hours below 35 or above 45 are excluded. Figure 2 compares weekly
overtime from the IAB statistics, mean repoti overtime last month divided by 4.33, and the
mean of actual hours minus standard hours (with negative values changed to zeros). The sample
weights are used in calculating the means. For the thr= years it is available, the measure based
on monthly overtime tallies remarkably well with the publishd data, while the measure basal
on actual hours is higher, and fluctuates differently. (Notice that the flat aggregate overtime plot
masks considerable fluctuations at the industry level.) This figure suggests that the monthly
overtime figures should be preferred. A similar exercise may be performed for the measure of
average “undertime” (standard minus actual hours, with negative values changed to zero), and
this average is considerably higher than the sum of published short-time and bad-weather time
(these results are not shown).
Figure 3 shows the dramatic transformation in standard and actual hours for Arbeiter
(loosely: workers paid hourly) in manufacturing and construction in the sample, between 1984
and 1989.a In 1984 standard hours were almost universally 40 per week, while only about half
still had 40 hours in 1989. Actual hours also have a huge shift down from 40 hours. Figure
4 shows a similar pattern for Angestellten (salaried workers) in manufacturing and construction.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the transformation in semices was less advancd by 1989 than in
manufacturing.
14Figures 7 and 8 show how overtime is compensate for Arbeiter and Angestellten
manufacturing/construction and in services in 1984 and 1989. A large but falling majority
in
of
Arbeiter in manufacturing are (only) paid for overtime, while about only about half of Arbeiter
in services receive compensation exclusively in the form of monetary payment. Only a minority
of Angestellten are only paid, and the proportion fell between 1984 and 1989.
Figures 9 and 10 show the distribution of overtime as mmured by the difference between
actual and standard weekly hours. 23% of Arbeiter in manufacturing worked overtime in 1984
and 33% in 1989, and slightly lower proportions in services. 4% of Arbeiter in manufacturing
report undertime in 1984, and 3% in 1989. A very high proportion of Angestellten report
overtime. Figure 11 shows for 1989 overtime as measured by the response to the question about
overtime in the last month. For comparison purposes the variable is divided by 4.33 to obtain
wekly overtime. This measure suggests approximately the same proportions working overtime,
but indicates less overtime per w=k (it is not clear if this was to be expected, given that the
w=kly question asked about the “average” week).
Such a large proportion of Angestellten get payment in days off that the overtime figures
are likely to be very unreliable, so I emphasize Arbeiter in my hours analysis. I retain Arbeiter
in services, even though almost half of those doing overtime rweive some compensation in the
form of days off. Notice that even though a small proportion of Arbeiter in manufacturing are
compensated for overtime with days off, the proportion is rising, which will introduce a bias
towards finding a shift to overtime if the rise is occurring principally in industries whose
standard hours were reducd. Bamten (civil servants) are also excluded, although others in the
public sector are retained.
15Hours Results
My interest is not in the relation between the level of standard hours and the level of
actual hours: I want to know how actual hours change when standard hours change. If
construction always has high standard hours and high overtime for technological reasons, I do
not want this cross-section component to lead me to conclude that raising standard hours will
raise overtime, and hence raise actual hours more than proportionately, for example. A common
way to look at the relation betw~n differences with panel data is to use individual fixed or
random effects. If I do this, with actual hours as the dependent variable and standard hours and
possibly industry dummies as an independent variables, I still allow the variation in standard
hours arising from a worker’s change of industry to influence the coefficient on standard hours.
To restrict the variation in standard hours to be within job variation, and hence primarily
variation induced by the union contracts, I use information on job changes to generate worker-
job fixed or random effects. That is, each employment spell with the same firm rmeives a fixed
or random effect. (Some workers will experience hours changes by changing jobs within a firm:
this variation will be allowed to influence the coefficient on standard hours.)
Results were generally found to differ quite a bit betw~n manufacturing and
construction, on the one hand, and services on the other, so analysis is conducted separately for
the two ~tors. The first set of results, for manufacturing and construction, is shown in Table
1, where the dependent variable is actual hours worked on average in a week, and the main
independent variable of interest is “agreed” or standard hours per week as reported by the
respondent. A coefficient of 1 on standard hours implies no shifting to overtime, while a
16coefficient of Oimplies full shifting to overtime. The regressions include year dummies, which
control partially for the business cycle and for other trends in overtime.
The first two columns perform fixd and random
hours in the preferred fixed effmts spwification is 0.85
effects, and the ufficient on standard
and significantly different from 1. As
was discussed above, the use of days off as compensation for overtime when standard hours are
rduced is likely to bias the coefficient towards zero. Also, classical measurement error in
standard hours will bias the coefficient toward zero. This latter problem may be remedied by
instrumenting standard hours as reported by the respondent with standard hours for the industry
in the month of the interview as obtaind from published sources.9 Because the GSOEP
aggregates industries, the published hours used to instrument are an average (weighted by
employment) of standard hours in the sub-industries. The third (FE IV) column in Table 1 does
this for fixd effects. The point estimate of the coefficient on standard hours rises to 1.16, but
the standard error is very large (although the coefficient is significantly different from uro). 10
Another possible instrument for reported standard hours is the average response of respondents
in the same industry and year. In the case of manufacturing this instrument s=ms to be
correlated with the error term, and is not used.
The remaining mlumns of Table 2 analyze dir=tly the incidence and length of overtime
and undertime. The fourth column - P(OT > O)- uses a fixed effects conditional logit to examine
the probability of a respondent reporting actual hours greater than standard hours. The
coefficient on standard hours is significant and negative, indicating a shift towards overtime use
when standard hours are reduced. The magnitude of the coefficient implies that a 1% fall in
standard hours raises the probability of overtime by 7.1% .ll The column headed “OT”
17indicates that standard hours do not significantly aff=t the length of overtime, conditional on
overtime being positive. The coefficient of 0.28 in the P(UT > O)column implies that a 1%
rduction in standard hours would rduce the incidence of probability of reported actual hours
being lower than standard hours by 11%. (In regressions not reported, the length of undertime
conditional on undertime being non-zero was not significantly affected by standard hours. Nor
did regressions including undertime as negative values of overtime yield significant coefficients.)
The response of overtime and undertime to a one hour fall in standard hours may be
calculated from the logit elasticities. A reduction in standard hours from 40 to 39 hours is a
2.5 % fall, which implies an increase in overtime of 0.3 hours (average overtime is 1.75 hours)
and a reduction in undertime of 0.2 hours (average undertime is 0.75 hours), mming that actual
hours only fall by 0.5 hours. The lower response of actual hours implied here mmpared with
the regressions with actual hours as a dependent variable is puzzling. It may be due to imprecise
estimate of the effect of standard hours on the length of overtime and undertime. Length of
overtime may have fallen, offsetting the impact of the incrased incidence, but this would require
quite a large coefficient compared to the standard error as currently estimated in the final
column.
Table 2 repeats the regressions of Table 1 for the service sector. The coefficient on
standard hours in the fixed effects specification is 0.62, lower than for manufacturing, and
possibly due to greater measurement error (as inspection of the data suggests). The third column
of Table 2 instruments standard hours with the average response of similar respondents in the
same year. The correlation is 0.3, and for services correlation of this instrument with the errors
may be rejected. Again the main effect of instrumenting is to increase the standard error. The
18problem with this instrument may be that the large number of service categories means some
have very few workers in them in a given year, and hence averaging does not reduce
measurement error much. 12The coefficient on standard hours in the regressions examining
overtime and undertime dir~tly are insignificant, although in the overtime logit it is close to
significant.
So far the only control for the business cycle ud has b=n year dummies, which is
rather crude since different industries fluctuate differently. It could be that industries which
rtiucd hours experienced falls in demand and hence desired in any case to reduce overtime
hours. In the absence of information truly reflecting demand for the output of s=tors, the best
that can be done is to control for sales, while rdizing that this to a large extent conditions out
the scale effect. However, sales in either the month or year of the interview was always
insignificant, whether entered directly or interacted with standard hours. Replacing sales with
month-to-month or year-to-year log difference in sales makes no difference.
Table 3 investigates whether the effect of standard hours on actual hours varies by firm
size. Many of the contracts reducing standard hours provided for increased flexibility in the
use of standard hours, which, although a concession by the unions, was thought likely to work
towards higher employment by reducing the scale eff~t and possibly the substitution from labor
to capital by making labor more attractive along another dimension. It was generally thought
that the flexibility clauses, implemented on a firm by firm basis, could only be taken advantage
of by large firms. The results, while not always significant, suggest less shifting towards
overtime in the excluded category: firms with more than 2000 employees, although the
magnitudes are not large.
19The results of these tables may be checked by using the responses to the direct question
about monthly overtime. A second measure of actual w=kly hours is constructed by adding
standard hours and reported overtime hours in the previous month divided by 4.33. The bias
on the uninstrumented coefficient on standard hours in this case is unclear - classical
measurement emor in this case biases the coefficient toward one, since the measurement error
is aJso added to the independent variable, However, the fact that the overtime variable has no
negative responses may introduce a bias toward zero as discussed above. Table 4 presents
results for manufacturing of regressions run for the y-s 1986, 1988 and 1989, the years for
which monthly overtime is available. The top panel of the table reruns the regressions of Table
1 using reported actual hours for the subset of years, as a basis for comparison, while the lower
panel reports results for these regressions using the actual hours variable constructed from
monthly overtime. The results of the top panel are similar to those found for all six years in
Table 1, although standard errors are larger.
The uninstrumented fixed and random effwts results in the lower panel indicate
coefficients very close to one, possibly due to the upward bias of the classical measurement error
(although these coefficients are not significantly different from those in the upper panel).
Instrumenting in the following column scarcely lowers the point estimate, and the large standard
error means it is still not significantly different from one. The fixd effect conditional logit for
the probability of reporting overtime yields an insignificant coefficient on standard hours, and
likewise for fixed or random effwts estimation of the length of overtime (conditional on
overtime being positive) in the final column. Thus the results of this panel do not point to any
shift to overtime, unlike the results of Table 1.
20Table 5 repeats these regressions for services. The number of observations is rather
small in these regressions (the fixed effwts regressions are in effect based on the 329 person-
jobs which have more than one observation), so the standard errors are large enough in both
panels so that little carI be inferrd. The point estimates in the lower panel again point to no
shifting towards overtime. Interacting standard hours with the firm six dummies in the
regressions based on reported monthly overtime yield insignificant coefficients.
The analysis has yielded qualitatively different results for manufacturing depending upon
whether it was based on reported actual hours, which indicated shifting to overtime and from
undertime, or reported overtime in the previous month, which showed no shifting, but
quantitatively the difference is not large: a one hour reduction in standard hours reduces actual
hours by betw~n 0.85 and 1 hour, There is one other set of variables to be appealed to, namely
the information on receipt of short-time or bad-weather compensation. Fixed effects conditional
logits have been run for the probability of reporting such compensation, and the coefficient on
standard hours in these regressions is insignificant (these results are not shown).
The results for Angestellten are not reported, as the hours variables are considered too
unreliable, but the results are summarized here. For manufacturing the fixed and random effects
regressions suggest more shifting towuds overtime than for Arbeiter, when analysis is based on
reported actual hours. Otherwise results are similar to those for Arbeiter, including that
instrumenting principally raises standard errors, that fixed and random effects regressions for
constructed actual hours yield coefficients on standard hours close to one, and that fixed effects
conditional logits for the probability of reported monthly overtime yield insignificant coefficients
on standard hours.
21Wage Results
Were a measure of hourly straight-time wage available, the approach would simply be
to add standard hours as a regressor to freed and random effects @rson-job effects) wage
regressions. This approach does oversimplify the problem: while in some years standard hours
are predetermined and only wages are endogenous, in many years wages and hours are jointly
determined, and furthermore there may be timing issues involved, such as the wage bargaining
anticipating future reductions in standard hours. Nevertheless, such an approach will pickup
the broad correlation between changes in wages and changes in standard hours even if causality
is not implied and fine details of timing are overlooked.
The difficulty addresd here is therefore simply that the wage measure available is
monthly and includes possible overtime (OT~ and undertime (UT~. Denote w as the straight-
time hourly wage, and w~ as the monthly wage including overtime and undertime. p is the
overtime premium, h, is the weekly standard hours. The straight-time hourly wage is modelled
as log(w) - a+~X+yhJ+e (3)
(with i,t subscripts and modelling of the error suppressed for simplicity), while the monthly
wage is defined as WM- w (4.33h#+(l+p)oTM-uTM)
The log of the monthly wage may thus be written
log(w~) - a +~X+yh. +e +log(4.33h,+(l+p)OTM-~M)
[
(l+p)oTM UTM
- a+~x+yh~+e +log(4.33h~)+log1+ 433h -—
4.33h8
1+P OT” 1 ~T:+e - a’+~X+yh~+log(h)+— —-——
4.33 h, 4.33 h,
(4)
22where the approximation log(l +x)=x for small x has b=n used, which assumes that monthly
overtime and undertime are small compared with monthly standard hours.
The coefficient of interest is of course gamma. We have not yet ftished with data
difficulties, however. We know monthly overtime for certain years, but we do not have a
corresponding measure of monthly undertime. One possibility is to estimate equation (5) without
the term for undertime, hoping that its omission does not bias gamma. A =ond possibility is
to use the weekly measures of overtime and undertime (based on reported actual hours) and
assume that multiplying by 4.33 yields monthly overtime and undertime (which is likely to
overstate both).
The coefficients on log(h,) and (where included) UT/h, are restricted to be 1 and -1
respectively. Initially the coefficient on OT/h, was left unrestricti, since p varies across
people: if overtime is compensated it is typically at 25% premium, but Sunday work, for
example, carries a higher premium, and for Angestellten some overtime is not compensated.
However, the unrestricted coefficient estimatd implied an overtime premium of only about
12%, while respondents to the question asked in 1986 about their overtime premium gave a
median response of 25% (for both Arbeiter and Angestellten; the means were 24% and 21%
respectively). In the results presented, therefore, p is restricted to be 0.25, but this restriction
hardly affects gamma.
Table 6 presents results using the monthly measure of overtime, omitting any measure
of undertime. There are fewer observations than in the corresponding regressions in the hours
swtion due to missing values in the wage variable. The results for fixed effects are presented -
random effects produced extremely similar coefficients on standard hours, and were rejwted
23by the Hausman tests. The results show that a one hour fall in standard hours was associated
with a significant relative rise in the straight-time hourly wage of between 2% and 3%, except
for Angestellten in services, where the coefficient is negative but insignificant.
Table 7, where overtime and undertime are based on reported actual hours, show
significant negative coefficients on standard hours only for Arbeiter in manufacturing and
Angestellten in services. Imposing a coefficient of -1 on the undertime ratio variable has an
important effmt on the coefficient on standard hours: when the overtime and undertime ratio
variables are left unrestricted, the undertime ratio is insignificant, and the coefficients and
standard emors on standard hours are very similar to those in Table 6. Undertime therefore does
not seem to capture what was intended, and the results of Table 6 are prefemed.
As usual, measurement error in standard hours will bias its coefficient toward zero. The
result of instrumenting with the instruments of the hours section is once again principally to
increase the standard errors of the coefficient, so these results are not reported.
These results agree with those found by the time-series of Franz and Smolny (1994), and
accord with the claims of the unions. A one hour fall in standard hours from 39 or 38 hours
represents a 2.6% fall, while
monthly pay for an individual
Table 6 suggests straight-time hourly wages rose 2-3%. So
not working overtime remained the same after a reduction in
hours, compared to individuals in industries with constant hours. Results not reported provide
further support: log monthly wages are regressed on standard hours and year dummies for 1984-
89, without attempting to adjust for hours and overtime. As expected, the coefficients on
standard hours are small (between -0.001 and 0.003) and insignificant, indicating that monthly
pay was little affected by standard hours.
24To square these wage results with Lehment (1991), it must be the case that wage rises
induce such a large substitution effect from workers to hours as to raise employment, and that
this was of more importance than the reduction in standard hours. Another possibility is that
the wage restraint he observed was not driven by standard hours reductions, but rather occurred
in all industries. A final possibility, impossible to test without good data on capiti, is that the
reductions in standard hours raised productivity, so that effative wages fell.
Concluiow
Unions in cetin German industries negotiated reductions in standard hours beginning
in 1985. Such reductions are likely to cause a negative scale effect and substitution towards
capital, but employment may rise if there is sufficient substitution from hours to workers. I
have established that, at least for Arbeiter (hourly workers) in manufacturing, a one hour fall
in standard hours led to a fall in actual hours of between 0.85 and 1 hour. A large response
such as this is a necessary condition for substitution from hours to workers to be large. These
results are similar to results for other countries or time periods. The wording of the questions
on hours worked m&e conclusions on substitution between workers and hours for Arbeiter in
services and Angestellten (salaried workers) difficult.
Given that actual hours fell a lot, one would expect workers to experience a fall in
earnings. I find in addition, however, that a one hour reduction in standard hours was associated
with a 2-3% increase in the straight-time hourly wage, relative to sectors with no standard hours
reduction. This hourly increase is enough to offset the fall in hours worked, substantiating the
union claim that standard hours reductions were achieved with “full wage compensation”.
25These results are incompatible with the notion that reductions in standard hours were
accompanied by “wage restraint”.
Strictly speaking, the effect of a wage increase on employment is ambiguous, as the
presence of fixed costs of employment induces a substitution from hours to workers. The
finding of higher wages is thus consistent with the finding of a large fall in actual hours. We
do generally expect the scale effect and substitution to capital to
employment, however. Examination of wages and actual hours
unambiguous prediction of the net effect on employment of reducing
predominate and rduce
hence does not lead to
standard hours.
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29Notes
1. EuropeanIndustrialRelationsReview November 1983.
2. A large literature documents the implementationof standard hours reductions. See, for example,
Bosch (1990), Bosch et. al. (1988), Boschand Lehndorff (n.d,), EuropeanIndustrialRelations Review
(variousissum), Stille (1995), WSZ-Mitteilungen (variousissuti).
3. For theoretical examinationsofwork-sharing,seeBoothandRavallion(1993),BoothandSchiantarelli
(1987), Calmfors (1985), Freeman (1995),Hart (1987),and Konigand Pohlmeier (1988).
4. See Hamermwh (1993)and Hamermesh(1995)for discussionsof this,







This is less than zero if f> O.
6. In the original: “Wie viele Wochenstundenbetragt Ihre vereinbarte Arbeitszeit ohne Uberstunden?”
“Und wieviel betragt im Durchschnitt Ihre tatsachliche Arbeitszeit einschlimslich eventueller
Uberstunden? [Stundenpro Woche]”
7. It is also unclear what workers who are on strike rwpond to the quwtions.
8. The sample weights are used to create the figur~. The GSOEPoversamplm foreigners, who work
less overtime than Germans.
9. For the minority of workers in industrieswhere bargainingdow not take place at the national level,
a weighted average of the standardhours in differentregions is used.
10. The correlation between the published and reportd standard hours is only 0.52. Reasons for
differences in addition to measurement error in the respondentvariable include: the fact that in some
industriesstandardhours ordyhaveto averageto the agreedstandardhours acrossemploy=, that I have
imputedsome interviewmonths, that the aggregationof industriesin the GSOEPmeanspublishedhours









alternative obvious]y is to instrumentas for manufacturingwithpublishedstandardhours. The
difficultyisthat the bargainingunits inservicesaremuchsmaller, ad ha~ea greater tendencyto bargain
separatelyby region.
30Table 1: Analysis Based on Reported Actual Hours:
Manufacturing and Construction 1984-1989
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
II Reported actual hours I P(OT > O) P(UT>O) I OT
FE
T
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N*T (toti ohs) I 8560 I 2413
N (cross-section) I 3001 I 1307
Notes:
a. Workers paid hourly (Arbeiter).
b. Overtime OT=reported actual hours-standard hours if positive, zero otherwise.
c. Undertime UT= standard hours-reported actual hours if positive, zero otherwise.
d. RE refers to random effects, FE to fixed eff~ts: person-job effects.
e. Excluded instrument for IV is published standard hours in industry and month of interview.
31Table 2: Analysis Based on Reported Actual Hours: Services 1984-1989
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
ReDorted actual hours P(OT > O) P(-UT> o)














































































a. Workers paid hourly (Arbeiter).
b. Overtime OT=reported actual hours-standard hours if positive, zero otherwise.
c. Undertime UT= standard hours-reported actual hours if positive, zero otherwise.
d. RE refers to random effects, FE to fixed effats: person-job effects.
e. Excluded instrument for IV is average response of Arbeiter in that industry and year.
32Table 3: Analysis Based on Reported Actual Hours: The Effect of Firm Si=
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Manufacturing/Construction Services
Actual hours P(OT > O) Actual hours I P(OT>O)





































Year dummies? yes yes yes







0.81 0.00 -- -- -- --
0.00
8560
0.00 I -- --
N*T (total ohs) 1893
N (cross-section) 3001 855
Notes:
a. Workers paid hourly (Arbeiter).
b. Overtime OT=reported actual hours-standard hours if positive, zero otherwise.
c. RE refers to random effects, FE to fixed effecti: person-job effects.
33Table4: Manufacturing and Construction 1986,
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1988-9
A. Analysis based on reported actual hours
Reported actual hours P(OT > O) OT
RE FE FE IV FE logit RE
Standard Hours h, 0.96 0.90 1.19 -0.22 0.16
(0.09) (0.14) (0.60) (0.07) (0.13)
Industry dummies 0.51 -- -- .- ..
=ro? (p-value)
Hausman (p-value) 0.00 -- -- 0.66
B. Analysis based on monthly overtime (0~)
Constructed actual hours P(OTM> O) OT”/4.33
RE FE FE IV FE logit RE
Standard Hours h, 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.28) (0.06) (0.09)
Industry dummies 0.00 -- -. -- --
zero? @-value)
Hausman (p-value) 0.13 -- -- 0.73
Year dummies? yes yes yes yes yes
Industry, education, yes no no no yes
nationality ,gender,
firm sin?
N*T (total ohs) 3991 1260/1265
N (cross-section) 2080 886/901
Notes:
a. Workers paid hourly (Arbeiter).
b. Overtime OT=reported actual hours-standard hours if positive, zero otherwise.
c. Constructed actual hours = standard hours + reported monthly overtime/4.33.
d. RE refers to random effwts, FE to fixed effats: person-iob effects. .
e. Excluded instrument for IV is published standard hours in industry and month of intetiew.
34Table 5: Services 1986, 1988-9
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
A. Analysis based on reported actual hours
Reported actual hours P(OT > O) OT
RE FE FE IV FE logit RE
Standard Hours h, 0.68 0.83 -0.16 -0.05
(0.22) (0.39) (;:%) (0.24) (0.26)
Industry dummies 0.05 -- -- -- --
zero? (p-value)
Hausman (D-value) 0.00 -- -- 0.21
B. Analysis based on monthly overtime (0~)
h,
Constructed actual hours P(OT”> O) OT”/4.33
RE FE FE IV FE logit RE
Standard Hours h, 1.21 1.22 0.99 0.07 0.18
(0.09) (0.13) (0.46) (0.06) (0.28)
Industry dummies 0.02 -- -- -- --
zero? (p-value)
Hausman (p-value) I 0.20 I -- I -- I 0.35
Year dummies? yes yes yes yes yes
Industry, education, yes no no no yes
nationality, gender,
firm size?
N*T (total ohs) 849 297/307






Workers paid hourly (Arbeiter).
Overtime OT=reportd actual hours-standard hours if positive, zero otherwise.
Constructed actual hours = standard hours + reported monthly overtime/4.33.
RE refers to random effects, FE to fixed effats: person-job effects.
Excluded instrument for IV is average response of Arbeiter in that industry and year.
35Table 6: Wage Regressions 1986, 1988-9; Reported Monthly Overtime (OT”)
Arbeiter @aid hourly) Angeskllten (salaried)
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
Standard Hours h, -0.020 -0.026 -0.029 -0.010
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
log(hJ 1 1 1 1
0T”/(4.33*h~ 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
UT”/(4,33*h,) -- -. -- --
Year dummies? yes yes yes yes
Hausman (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N*T (total ohs) 3711 788 1096 1938
N (cross-section) 1972 487 607 1125
Notes:
a. The dependent variable is gross earnings in the previous month on main job.
b. Estimation is by fixed effects: person-job effwts.
c. Manufacturing includes instruction.
d. If no standard error is reported, the value of the coefficient has been imposed.
e. The Hausman test refers to a random effects s~ification including all those covariates
included in random effects regressions in earlier tables.
36Table 7: Wage Regressions 1984-1989; Overtime Based on Reported Actual Hours
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Arbeiter (paid hourly) Angestellten (salaried)
Manufacturing Services Manufacturing Services
Standard Hours h, -0.018 -0.009 -0.011 -0.018
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
log(hJ 1 1 1 1
OT/h, 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
UT/h, -1 -1 -1 -1
Year dummies? yes yes yes yes
Hausman (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N*T (total ohs) 7900 1769 2210 3921
N (cross-section) 2872 811 833 1557
Notes:
a. The dependent variable is gross earnings in the previous month on main job.
b. Estimation is by fixed effects: person-job effects.
c. Manufacturing includes construction.
d. Overtime OT =reported actual hours-standard hours if positive, zero otherwise.
e. Undertime UT= standard hours-reported actual hours if positive, zero otherwise.
f. If no standard error is reported, the value of the coefficient has been imposed.
g. The Hausman test refers to a random effects s~ification including all those covariates
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